Wednesday, October 29, 2008

The IDF's New Response Policy vis-à-vis Hizbollah: How Viable is It?



A lively discussion has developed recently concerning the IDF's new response policy in the event of a renewed confrontation with Hizbollah. An article in Haaretz by Amos Harel; an interview given by GOC Northern Command Gadi Eizencout to Yediot Ahronot; the INSS Insight of early October by Gabriel Siboni; and a forthcoming piece in Strategic Assessment by Giora Eiland are among the recent forums for this debate.
Maj. Gen. Eizencout called the IDF's new response policy vis-à-vis Hizbollah the "Dahiyah doctrine": "What happened to the Dahiyah neighborhood of Beirut in 2006 will happen to each village from which Israel is fired on. We will apply disproportionate force and inflict huge damage and destruction. In our mind, these are not civilian villages but army bases…the next war must be decided quickly, aggressively, and without seeking international approval…Hizbollah understands very well that firing from villages will lead to their destruction." Gen. Eizencout explained that during the Second Lebanon War, the IDF attempted to prevent massive missile fire directed at Israel mainly through an effort to attack the missiles and their launchers in pinpoint fashion. From now on, he clarified, the policy will be different. "This won't be another 'launcher hunt' – that's total nonsense. When the other side has thousands of missiles and rockets, you don't have the option of hunting them. You might see one or two impressive operations, but the home front will get hit."

This is indeed a new policy of exercising force against Hizbollah, different from the policy implemented during the Second Lebanon War. Apparently the goals of the policy and the publicity surrounding it are to amplify Israeli deterrence and dissuade Hizbollah from escalating operations and reigniting the fire in the north. The policy's success depends on the assessment formed among Hizbollah leaders concerning the policy's credibility and Israel's determination to actually exercise it.
In this context, it is important to examine the new policy and its intrinsic risks from Israel's viewpoint. The policy is unequivocal with respect to the nature of an IDF response to a provocative action on the part of Hizbollah. In contrast, it contains a discernable vagueness as to the circumstances under which the policy would be activated. In essence, it does not provide a clear answer to the following questions:
Is this a policy of response solely in the event of an overall military confrontation between Israel and Hizbollah, when it is clear that the accepted rules of the game between the sides are in any case changing dramatically, or is it also relevant in the event of a limited conflict?
What intensity of fire by Hizbollah would activate the new response policy? Would sporadic missile fire justify a change in the game rules, or only massive fire?
Would this policy be activated only in the event of missile fire, or could "normal" artillery fire also invite the new response policy?
Will the change be set in motion only in the case of Hizbollah fire causing numerous Israeli casualties; or might massive fire into open areas that does not cause a large number of casualties also change the policy?
Will there be any distinction between Hizbollah fire at military targets and fire directed at civilian settlements?
Will the response policy be activated only in the event of fire directed at strategic targets and urban centers far from the Lebanese border; or will the principle of "what goes for Tel Aviv also goes for Kiryat Shmona and Margliyot" apply?
Will the new response policy be activated following a warning to village inhabitants in Lebanon, allowing them to evacuate the area; or will the response policy be implemented automatically, without enabling a retreat?
Finally, how will the plan be applied if it becomes evident that village inhabitants are shunning a mass exodus? Would the IDF activate massive fire that results in hundreds or possibly thousands of civilians killed?
These and other questions have no clear answer. Hizbollah can assume that the new response policy relates solely to scenarios resembling those of July-August 2006, namely: a comprehensive military conflict in which Hizbollah levels massive missile fire at northern border settlements and cities such as Nahariya, Acre, Haifa, Afula, and Hadera.
Even in extreme circumstances such as this, Hizbollah can assume that Israel would seriously hesitate before implementing such a policy of force against Hizbollah and civilian villages as implied by the principles of the new policy. Certain arguments and past examples are likely to lead Hizbollah to the conclusion that Israel would abstain from implementing the new response policy:
Throughout Israel's long history of confronting terror organizations, senior echelons in Israel repeatedly issued threats of a response policy to be activated if and when Israel would be provoked. In practice, in numerous instances Israel avoided carrying out a considerable portion of those threats. This is how Israel acted following the withdrawal from southern Lebanon in May 2000 and the withdrawal from Gaza in August 2005. Thus it is eminently possible that Israel's fiery declarations will remain tantamount to a shelf dogma only.
Israel's avoidance of hitting infrastructures in Lebanon at the beginning of the Second Lebanon War (though it was clear this was a comprehensive military confrontation with Hizbollah) and its reluctance to interrupt the supply of fuel, electricity, and water to the Gaza Strip (even when there was massive firing of Qassam rockets into Sderot and Ashkelon) are instructive of Israel's internal constraints over the use of force involving any kind of substantial injury to the welfare of the civilian population. Massive village bombings incur the more severe risk of extensive civilian fatalities. It is doubtful whether any government in Israel would be willing to risk the consequences of approving such steps.
Israel's desire to spare a civilian population stems not only from its fears of international public reaction, but also from pressures from international leaders, particularly the American administration, and internal constraints. Very wide circles within Israeli society – politicians, legal experts, intellectuals, and academics – are likely to challenge the IDF on implementing a policy that entails risks of mass fatalities of civilians not actively involved in firing at Israel, but who find themselves in the area from which the firing originates.
The new response policy is indirectly based on the premise that Israel is capable of striking Hizbollah population centers and infrastructures. Hizbollah also reportedly possesses a system of long range missiles capable of striking almost any point in Israel. Israel cannot assume it would manage to destroy this system at the beginning of a campaign as it did at the beginning of the Second Lebanon War. Thus, Hizbollah can assume that it has the ability to maintain an effective balance of terror against Israel that would deter any Israeli government from implementing its new response policy.
Hizbollah may likely conclude that in the final analysis, Israel will avoid implementing the new policy of response being trumpeted today. If so, Hizbollah is liable to test Israel's credibility and determination through a varied assortment of scenarios. As such, proclamations of a new response policy carry with them no small risk. If there is no unequivocal resolve to realize this policy - which seems highly likely – the result may well be the erosion rather than strengthening of Israel's deterrent capability.

Israel seeks to upgrade passive missile-defence system


Israel is improving its passive-defence capability against ballistic-missile attack as part of its current programme of upgrades to its missile defences. Details of the scheme first appeared in the Israeli press in mid-October. According to these reports, the objective of the improved passive-defence system is to boost the country's ability to endure a sustained bombardment by long-range ballistic missiles, such as Iranian Shahab or Syrian-manufactured 'Scud' variants. It does not address the threat of short-range rocket attacks that are intended to be countered by the Iron Dome system. A central component of the new scheme is an enhanced impact point prediction (IPP) capability that is currently being developed by the Israel Air Force . This will fuse trajectory data on incoming missile threats provided by multiple radars, including the United States' TPY-2 X-band radar that has recently been deployed to the Negev in southern Israel , and from electro-optical sensors. The process of data fusion is intended to provide an enhanced estimate of where a hostile missile will impact, if not intercepted, and to identify the areas that may be affected by debris if the missile is intercepted by Israeli active defences. Israel's passive-defence system, as organised during the 1991 missile attacks from Iraq and modified during the 2006 Lebanon conflict, currently divides the country into ten areas for warning purposes. The population must either be warned to take cover nationwide or throughout one of these areas, halting all activity until the all-clear is given. The upgraded system is reported to have the goal of dividing the country into a larger number of warning areas, so that military and economic activity can continue normally in areas not deemed to be at risk from an incoming missile. By early 2009, the new system will be able to handle 27 target areas; when it becomes fully operational in the second quarter of 2010, it will be able to handle about 100 areas. Other elements of the passive-defence upgrade include improvements to Israel's long-standing siren warning system. This now covers almost all of the country and will be made able to respond to the more precisely targeted warnings.

Tuesday, October 28, 2008

Israeli intelligence agency reportedly in Ghana over kidnap of businessman

A security analyst has warned that the reported kidnapping of an Israeli businessman in Ghana could expose the country to more international security risks. Dr Kwesi Anim says the alleged involvement of the Israeli security service (MOSSAD) in the investigation, does not auger well for the country.
National Security coordinator announced over the weekend that the kidnapers have asked for a ransom of 300,000 dollars from the family of the victim.
In an interview with Joy news, Dr Anim warned that the case could be an indication of worse things to come.

Saturday, October 25, 2008

נסראללה: לא מעורבים בסמים ובהלבנת כסף


חיזבאללה מנער את ההאשמות על מעורבות למבריחי סמים: השייח' חסאן נסראללה אומר היום (ש') כי הטענות לפיהן ארגונו מעורב בעסקאות סמים והלבנות כסף הן "קמפיין תעמולתי".

נסראללה צילום ארכיון: אי-פי"קיים ניסיון לפגוע בתדמית של חיזבאללה באמצעות שקרים וההאשמות כמו אלו המתפרסמות בנוגע לקשר עם קולומביה", אמר נסראללה בראיון לערוץ הטלוויזיה אל-מנאר. דבריו של נסראללה מגיעים בעקבות טענות של חוקרים אמריקניים וקולומביאנים לפיהן נחשפה רשת בינלאומית של הברחת קוקאין והלבנת כספים אשר מנצלת חלק מרווחיה כדי לתמוך בארגון חיזבאללה. ארצות הברית וקולומביה חוקרת את הנושא במשך שנתיים, ובימים האחרונים עצרו הרשויות 36 בני אדם, בחשד כי היוו את מרכז התקשורת בין סוחרי הסמים במרכז אמריקה לבין נציגי הארגון. החשודים מואשמים כי עבדו עם כנופיות סמים קולומביאניות כדי להבריח קוקאין לארצות הברית, אירופה והמזרח התיכון. בנוסף, חשוד אחד מהעצורים, צ'קרי הרב, כי נסע תכופות ללבנון, סוריה ומצרים והיה בקשר טלפוני עם דמויות מרכזיות בחיזבאללה, כך לפי בכירים בקולומביה. >>
חשש: ונצואלה תהפוך לבסיס חיזבאללה
"הרווחים ממכירת הסמים הלכו למימון החיזבאללה", אמר גלאדיז סאנצז', חוקר בכיר בתביעה נגד החשודים. "זוהי דוגמא לדרך שבה שינוע של סמים משרת את האינטרסים של כל הארגונים: סוחרי הסמים, הלבנת הכספים וארגוני טרור, בהם ארגון גרילה קולומביאני". גורמים הנלחמים בטרור במערב הביעו דאגה לנוכח סימנים לעלייה בנוכחות חיזבאללה בדרום אמריקה. בכירים בלוחמה בטרור בארצות הברית ובישראל
אף אמרו כי הברית בין נשיא ונצואלה, הוגו צ'אבז, לבין איראן מעלה את החששות כי ונצואלה תהפוך לבסיס אימוני חיזבאללה. הפרשה נחשפה לאחר שגורמים בקולומביה החלו לחקור את חברת הלבנת הכספים של הרב, וגילו כי יש קשר בינו לבין חיזבאללה בזמן שביצעו מעקב אחרי הכסף. על פי החשד, שילמה חברת הלבנת הכספים 12 אחוזים מרווחי הברחת הסמים לחיזבאללה, מרבית הכסף הועבר במזומן.


ההרוגים בתאונת המטוס: שני אחים, חברם וטייסת

בתאונת המטוס הקטלנית ליד המושב בצרה נהרגו שני האחים מחדרה, אבירם פסטרנק בן ה-32, ואחיו איתי בן ה-25, חברם מנחם זכריה בן 33 מנתניה, וכן הטייסת, אליאב ארבל בת ה-30 מכרמי יוסף. עד ראייה: "שמעתי צעקות היסטריות מהמטוס ואז הוא פגע בעצמה בשדה"
התרסקות המטוס הקטלנית אתמול על יד המושב בצרה גבתה אתמול (ו') את חייהם של ארבעה, בהם שני אחים מחדרה, אבירם פסטרנק, בן 32, ואחיו איתי בן ה-25. שני ההרוגים הנוספים הם חברת של השניים, מנחם זכריה בן 33 מנתניה, וכן הטייסת, אליאב ארבל בת ה-30 מכרמי יוסף.

זירת התרסקות המטוס בבצרה שבשרון צילום: עומר מסינגרשעות ספורות לאחר התרסקות המטוס סמוך למושב שבשרון, סיפרו עדי ראייה על המראות הקשים. "שמעתי צעקות היסטריות מתוך המטוס ואז הוא פגע בעוצמה בשדה", סיפר ל-nrg מעריב תושב בצרה. "כל חלקי המטוס עפו לכל הצדדים". פארמדיק: "הליך זיהוי הגופות עלול לארוך שעות". סמוך לשעה 16:30 אחר הצהריים דיווח מגדל הפיקוח בשדה התעופה בהרצליה כי מטוס קל מסוג ססנה השייך לבית הספר לטיסה בעיר איבד את הקשר עם המגדל. על פי הדיווח, המטוס נעלם ממסכי המכ"ם באיזור מושב בצרה. מיד עם קבלת הדיווח במוקד משטרת מחוז המרכז, הוזעקו כוחות גדולים של משטרה כדי לבצע סריקות במקום. במקביל, החלו להתקבל דיווחים מתושבי המושב על פיצוץ שנשמע בשטח פתוח באיזור. על פי הדיווחים, במטוס היו טייס ושלושה נוסעים. המנוע של המטוס כבה
"שמענו רעש מוזר כמו של טרקטור ואז המנוע של המטוס כבה", סיפר תושב בצרה, תום חן. "ראינו אותו מתחיל ליפול במהירות כלפי הקרקע. שמעתי צעקות היסטריות מתוך המטוס ואז הוא פגע בעוצמה בשדה תות. ישבתי ליד השדה ואז כל חלקי המטוס עפו לכל הצדדים". חן
הוסיף כי "המטוס התרסק בכניסה למושב בצרה, רק מטרים ספורים מכביש מספר 4 שהיה עמוס בכלי רכב. היה לנו הרבה מזל שהמטוס לא פגע באחד מכלי הרכב שחלף בכביש אלא פגע בשדה". מיקי כפרי, פארמדיק של מד"א מתחנת ירקון שהגיע למקום, סיפר גם הוא ל-nrg מעריב שעם הגעתנו לשטח, הצליחו הכוחות לחלץ שתי גופות של נוסעי המטוס.

Thursday, October 23, 2008

Baran Israel reveals: Lebanese Shiite Figures visited Jerusalem

Anti-Hezbollah Lebanese Shiite figures visited Israel's capital earlier this year, political sources told Baran Israel stating that these figures met with MKs and cabinet ministers including outgoing FM Tsebi Levni and Defence Minister Ehuda Barak.

The sources said both Mr A. A the son of a former speaker and Mr O. S paid each apart a visit under special measures where neither Visa's were Issured nor passports stamped and travelled via a safe diplomatic passage from the Jordanian side.

Mr A. A clearified to Israeli officials the view point of the Shiite silent majority that is terrified by terror group Hezbollah, stating that his people are peace seekers and share with the Jewish community in Israel the status of being a minority in the heart of a Sunni dominated Arab world.

The second guest Mr O. S said he regards Israel a friend of the Lebanese people in general and especially the Shiites, recalling Israel's development of the area it occupied in Southern Lebanon.

Mr O. S called on the Israeli goverment to embrace the Lebanese community in Israel and urged it to provide them with all what it can in return to their services during the Israeli presence in Lebanon.

باران إسرائيل العربية: خدمة للجمهور الأخر

جديدنا أخبار باللغة العربية..قريبا جدا

NEW REPORT FOR CENTURY FOUNDATION FROM RETIRED AIR FORCE COLONEL SAM GARDINER WARNS OF DANGERS OF ESCALATION IN U.S.-IRAN



The following information was released by the Century Foundation:
In it s waning months of power, the Bush administration has advanced a variety of escalating pressures against Iran that could trigger an unintended confrontation and tie the next president's hands, argues retired Air Force Colonel Sam Gardiner in a new paper for The Century Foundation. Among them, he writes, are covert operations through proxy groups inside Iran.
In Dangerous and Getting More Dangerous: The Delicate Situation between the United States and Iran, Gardiner suggests that the U.S. policy on Iran is "in conflict with itself." He writes that on the public side, the United States is working to change Iranian behavior by insisting that the Islamic Republic stop nuclear enrichment, stop involvement in Iraq and Afghanistan, and stop support of groups such as Hezbollah.
However, Gardiner argues, the United States is taking covert actions that can only be read in Tehran as working to change the Iranian regime-and would likely have the perverse result of strengthening those inside the Iranian power structure who are the most adamant in refusing to change course. Gardiner warns that this is not only bad policy, but also dangerous policy.
The report is a follow-up to Gardiner's 2006 report for The Century Foundation, The End of the "Summer of Diplomacy": Assessing the US Military Options on Iran. In that report, he discussed the pressures that were moving the United States toward the military option against Iran. In the new report, he describes how the United States policy has evolved over the past two years, moving more and more toward covert operations, as policymakers have come to see the costs of "preventive" military attack as prohibitive. He offers evidence of recent covert operations in Iran. He also considers Israel's role as a strategic rival to Iran in the region, and he assesses the ways the Iranians have reacted-and might react in the near future -- to what they deduce are hostile actions by the United States and Israel.
Gardiner makes recommendations to reduce the danger of an unintended escalation of violence. He argues for:
An agreement with Iran dealing with incidents at sea,
A congressional review of targeted killing and assassination as instruments of policy,
Making it clear that regime change in Iran is not U.S policy,
Being more critical of the assumptions behind U.S. policy-such as Iran is an existential threat to Israel and Iran would give nuclear weapons to terrorists.
Sam Gardiner is a retired U.S. Air Force colonel who has taught strategy and military operations at the National War College, Air War College, and Naval War College. In the writing of this report, Gardinerdraws on his long experience of forecasting crisis scenarios and running military war games that examine the use of force in the Middle East. "The situation has become very fragile and may well take on a life of its own," he writes in Dangerous and Getting M or e Dangerous. "The situation is likely to become more delicate and more explosive in the final months of the Bush administration and in the early months of a new U.S. administration."

Wednesday, October 22, 2008

Senior Israeli general missing during a visit to Turkey





Gen. S.P went missing ten days ago during a visit to the Turkish city of Istanbul Israeli military sources revelead to Baran Israel.
According to the sources, the missing general was on vacation with a close friend who lost communication with him three days after arriving in the Turkish city.
Israeli high rank security officials headed to turkey to discuss with Authorities a search plan taking in consideration the possibility that Gen. S.P might have been vaporised out of Turkey in case he is kidnapped by Hezbollah or any of its affliates.
Baran Israel will bring you the latest on the story whenever available.

Father, forgive me, I will not fight for your Israel




Conscience of the Israeli spymaster’s daughter

Omer Goldman is a very pretty girl, slender as a model. Never still and very restless, the expected loss of her freedom fills her with anxiety. For months before she refused to be drafted into the Israel Defence Forces she went to a psychologist every week to prepare for what was to come: incarceration in a cell in a military prison. A narrow cage for a songbird.
I met her several times during September, in an apartment, with other girls who are conscientious objectors. Together they would hand out flyers against Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza at the gates of a high school like the one she completed a year ago.
On her last day of freedom as a civilian, I saw her at the gates of the intake base to which she had received orders to report for induction for a two-year stint with the Israel Defence Forces (IDF), like every Israeli girl. But she came to refuse the draft, to be tried and to be imprisoned immediately.
Several dozen supporters showed up - ­ members of Anarchists Against the Wall, her mother and a few girlfriends - and she stayed close to them as though she were trying to delay the end, the moment when she would clash all alone with the army.
For Omer, this transition is sharper and more surprising than for most conscientious objectors: she is the daughter of the outgoing deputy head of Mossad, the man who very nearly became head of the organisation.


Omer grew up all her life in the warm bosom of a huge security establishment that has now become an enemy rather than a friend. Her father appears in the newspapers as 'N'. He was a senior intelligence officer and then transferred to Mossad and climbed to the top until in 2007 he became the deputy to Mossad chief Meir Dagan (right), now considered the most powerful mystery man in the Israeli security establishment.
'N', who specialises in the dilemma of Iran,
was spoken of as Dagan's designated successor, but Dagan had no intention of retiring. Differences of opinion developed between two strong bosses and 'N' resigned in June 2007.
This was the time when his daughter Omer, a pampered child of the wealthy suburb Ramat Hasharon, was beginning to move away from the usual high school-to-army trajectory.
Parallel to her father's struggle and his resignation from Mossad, Omer rebelled against the way he had paved for her and went to have a look at Palestinian life on the other side of the wall. Call this an adolescent's rebellion against her father or a battle for the heart of a father who had left home.
She is one of about 40 high school students who signed the 2008 12th-graders' letter. Thirty-eight years ago, the first such letter caused a huge uproar. In April 1970 students from my final year in secondary school sent a letter to the prime minister, Golda Meir, against the occupation and the war of attrition. Since then there have been other letters and the uproar has died down. But in Israel conscientious objection still arouses cold, self-righteous wrath.
Omer told me that the crucial moment of her metamorphosis occurred this year when she went to a Palestinian village where the IDF had set up a roadblock. Someone she had considered her enemy all her life stood beside her and someone who was supposed to be defending her opened fire at her.
"We were sitting by the roadside talking and soldiers came along and after a few seconds they received an order and fired gas grenades and rubber bullets at us. Then it struck me, to my astonishment, that the soldiers were following an order without thinking. For the first time in my life an Israeli soldier raised his weapon and fired at me."
And when you told your father?
"Dad was astonished and angry that I had been there and endangered my life. After that we had conversations. He supported me as his daughter and we have a good relationship, but he is decidedly opposed to what I do and even more to my refusal to serve in the army.
"At first he thought this was a passing phase of adolescence and later he understood that this is coming from a place deep inside me. He and I have very similar characters. I, too, fight to the end for what I believe in. But we are opposites ideologically."
When I ask more about her father, Omer smiles and does not answer. A rare moment of silence. The beauty of her smile covers for everything.
On September 23 she refused to serve in the army, was tried and was sent to prison for 21 days. Next week she will be tried again - and again until the army tires or she tires.
In two weeks' time, my own son Noam is due to join the army and I will be accompanying him to the same base where I last saw Omer Goldman. Unlike Omer, Noam intends to do his military service. I understand them both.

Wafic Safa

Since Hezbollah�s boss of external security, Imad Mughniyeh. was assassinated in Damascus on Feb. 12,Wafic Safa has taken on wider powers. Born in 1960 in the village of Zibdin in southern Lebanon, Safa initially joined the Amal movement before changing his allegiance to �Hezbollah� when it was founded in 1982. He then travelled to Iran to follow courses in intelligence and subsequently went on to North Korea in 1990, forming part of a group of �Hezbollah� militants that included Hassan Nasrallah, then a medium-level official in the movement and now its chief. Safa returned to Lebanon in 1994 and quickly found himself working for Mughniyeh. However, he took over as boss of Hezbollah�s internal services in 1998. On May 7 of this year, Safa led the assault of �Hezbollah� fighters against Sunni neighborhoods in Beirut and in the mountains inhabited by Druzes. During the May battle with the latter fighters he lost his right-hand man, Hassan al Bourji. Very close to Nasrallah, Safa nonetheless has enemies within the movement. Among them, Naim Kassem, is particularly powerful as he happens to be the party�s number two man.

Hezbollah Seeks Russian Arms

Inaugurated early this month under the auspices of secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, Hezbollah�s 9th Congress still hasn�t ended. The ambivalent feelings of the movement and its leadership towards Syria partly explain the delay in proceedings. Since the Feb. 12 assassination of Hezbollah�s external security chief Imad Mughniyeh in Damascus, top officials of the Lebanese Shi�ite movement have pulled out of Syria and the movement�s military chiefs have been looking at other ways of bringing weapons into Lebanon for their fighters. Because of the wish of part of Syria�s leadership to improve ties with the West, Paris and Washington were able to bring enough pressure to bear on Damascus to get it to seize a shipment of long-range Zilzal weapons destined for �Hezbollah�. To diversify its sources of supply, the Shi�ite movement has turned to Moscow which already sells weaponry to Damascus and Tehran. Passing themselves off as Iranian officials, Hezbollah�s military chief Fouad Shakar (alias Hajj Mohsen) and two other leading aides -armed forces chief of operations Mohamed Murtada and Nasrallah�s military adviser, Ibrahim Badreddine- travelled to Moscow on May 20 to examine buying Russian anti-aircraft missiles. (Russia�s arms agency Rosoboronexport is negotiating the sale of the 150 km-range S-300 system to Damascus and Tehran). Shi�ite military planners would like to place the missile�s launch pads on the heights of Mount Sannin in the center of Lebanon to strike at Israeli targets. Murtada and Badreddine returned to Russia in mid-August but ran into a flat refusal: while the Kremlin would like to sell the equipment to Tehran it won�t allow the systems to be transferred to �Hezbollah�. Moscow�s refusal angered the chief of Hezbollah�s executive council, Hachem Safieddine.

UN Resolution 1701: A View from Lebanon

Two years after the 2006 summer war, Hizballah and Israel continue to pay lip service to UN Security Council Resolution 1701 while focusing on preparations for the inevitable second round of conflict. Although Hizballah has not mounted a single border operation against Israel since the war, the Shiite organization has developed a new line of defense north of the Litani River and completed a massive, unprecedented recruitment, training, and rearmament drive. Meanwhile, Israel has signaled its displeasure with the inability of both the UN and the international community to halt Hizballah's military buildup.
Arms Smuggling
A week after the fighting ended on August 14, 2006, Turkish authorities reportedly intercepted five Iranian cargo planes and a Syrian aircraft carrying weapons to Hizballah. According to a Turkish newspaper, the arms included rocket launchers and crates of C-802 anti-ship missiles, the same weapon that disabled an Israeli missile boat on the third day of the war. Although Lebanon's eastern border with Syria is the traditional arms conduit for Hizballah, the party has devised alternative means of procuring weapons in the event of a closed land route.
In September 2006, a month after the fighting ended, Hizballah's secretary general, Hassan Nasrallah, claimed that "the resistance was able to rearm itself in a few days and is now stronger than it was on July 12," the first day of the war. By revealing the organization's renewed military strength, Nasrallah admitted tacitly that Hizballah was in breach of Resolution 1701. Paragraphs 14 and 15 of the resolution mandate the Lebanese government to secure its borders against arms smuggling and mandate other governments to prevent the sale or transfer of weapons, ammunition, equipment, and training to "entities or individuals" in Lebanon.
Although the Lebanese government has deployed about 8,000 Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) troops along the eastern border, Beirut is politically incapable of sealing off the frontier. Closing the border would provoke a backlash from the impoverished, mainly Shiite residents of the eastern Bekaa Valley who rely on the porous frontier to earn a living smuggling commercial goods. As such, a UN border assessment team reported in a August 2008 followup that the eastern "Green Border [the illegal crossings] remains as penetrable as it was during the mission of team one [in 2007]."
Buildup South of the Litani?
Hizballah's military preparations north of the Litani River and in the Bekaa Valley are well known. Vast tracts of land in this mountainous spine running north from the Litani to the lower reaches of the Barouk Mountains have been placed off-limits. The sound of explosions and machine gun fire has become commonplace in parts of the Bekaa Valley where Hizballah conducts its training.
What is less evident is the scale of Hizballah's military preparations near the southern border. Although Resolution 1701, paragraph 8, designates the area between the Blue Line (the UN's 2000 border demarcation between Israel and Lebanon) and the Litani River "free of any armed personnel, assets, and weapons" other than those of the Lebanese government and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), Hizballah is reportedly carrying out clandestine military preparations in the area. In late March, an armored UNIFIL patrol attempted to stop a tractor trailer driving through the western border sector late at night, but two cars and five armed men blocked the road, allowing the truck and its unknown contents to escape. In May, UNIFIL personnel encountered a group of men laying cables in the eastern sector of the UNIFIL area, where they were attacked with stones and their passage blocked by cars when they encountered a group of men laying cables in the eastern sector of the UNIFIL area. The implication was that the cables were part of Hizballah's fiber-optic communications network.
After the 2006 conflict, Hizballah abandoned most of its remote bunkers near the border, and those that UNIFIL and the LAF have located are periodically checked for renewed activity. No one knows, however, how many bunkers, rocket-firing positions, and observation posts remain undiscovered. Civilian sources in southern Lebanon claim that Hizballah continues to provision some of its war bunkers, keeping them stockpiled and paying local residents to monitor them. The border district remains an important component of Hizballah's battle plan in a potential war with Israel, even though the organization has repositioned its front line north of the Litani. Hizballah operates discreetly near the border out of political expediency and to avoid embarrassing the LAF, which is responsible for the area's security.
Sheikh Naim Qassem, Hizballah's deputy secretary general, recently gave an unenthusiastic endorsement of the party's observance of Resolution 1701, stating in a television interview that Hizballah originally was in "overall agreement" with the resolution, and "we think we have implemented it." Despite the tepid endorsement of 1701, Hizballah's bottom line remains the same: it will not scale back its preparation for the next encounter with Israel because of UN Security Council edicts.
Israeli Ire
Israel has complained repeatedly to the UN and UNIFIL about allegations of arms smuggling across the Lebanon-Syria border and objected that Hizballah is rebuilding its military infrastructure in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL, however, insists it has seen nothing to support the Israeli claims. As UNIFIL commander Maj. Gen. Claudio Graziano reportedly told Israeli foreign ministry officials in mid September, "UNIFIL does not have proof of Hizballah operations south of the Litani, and if Israel has such intelligence, they are welcome to send it to us." To emphasize Israel's frustration with the UN, Israeli defense minister Ehud Barak reportedly told a cabinet session in early August that Resolution 1701 "did not work, doesn't work, and is a failure," given that Syria and Iran had moved "munitions, rockets, and other weapon systems" into Lebanon.
Israel, however, would likely gain a more sympathetic ear from the UN if it were to desist from its own breaches of the resolution. Two years on, Israeli troops still patrol the Lebanese end of Ghajar, a village that straddles the Blue Line. UNIFIL has been mediating an Israeli exit from the Lebanese side of Ghajar, so far without success.
Israeli aircraft continue to violate Lebanese airspace on a near-daily basis, a violation that Hizballah frequently cites. The UN's latest report on 1701 stated that UNIFIL had recorded an average of more than twenty violations per day in April and May, including seventy-two violations by unmanned aerial vehicles in one day alone. Since Israel maintains that overflights provide vital intelligence and must continue as long as Hizballah smuggles arms into Lebanon, it is unlikely Israel will cease such operations in the near future.
In addition, despite repeated entreaties from the UN, Israel refuses to hand over the cluster bomb strike data from the 2006 war. That information would assist the effort to remove the remaining unexploded submunitions, which so far have caused over three hundred casualties.
Conclusion
Given what has transpired in Lebanon over the past two years -- both on the ground and in the air -- it would appear that Hizballah and Israel will continue to breach, and not honor, Resolution 1701. Preparing for the inevitable second round of conflict has taken priority -- for both parties -- over complying with the UN resolution.
Nicholas Blanford is a Beirut-based journalist and long-time observer of Hizballah. He is author of Killing Mr. Lebanon (I.B. Taurus, 2006), an account of the 2005 assassination of former Lebanese prime minister Rafiq Hariri.

Is Israel's booming high-tech industry a branch of the Mossad?


The above accusations come from journalist and writer James Bamford, whose new book, "The Shadow Factory: The Ultra-Secret NSA from 9/11 to the Eavesdropping on America" (Doubleday), came out this week in the United States. Bamford, a former producer for the ABC television network, has spent the last 30 years writing about the NSA - one of the most important and least-known intelligence agencies in the United States, but usually in the shadow of the Central Intelligence Agency. The NSA is responsible for eavesdropping on telephones, fax machines and computers; intercepting communications and electromagnetic signals from radar equipment, aircraft, missiles, ships and submarines; and decoding transmissions and cracking codes. It has contributed immeasurably to U.S. intelligence and national security. In this respect, the United States resembles Israel: Successes attributed to the Mossad should often be credited to other intelligence units - first and foremost Unit 8200, the Israeli equivalent of the NSA. This is Bamford's third book, and it affords a look into the mazes of the NSA. In 1982 the Justice department threatened to prosecute him for revealing agency secrets in his first book, "The Puzzle Palace: Inside the National Security Agency, America's Most Secret Intelligence Organization." In his second book, "Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency," he described the NSA with a great deal of enthusiasm, which made him the organization's hero of the day. The NSA even organized a party in his honor at headquarters in Fort Meade, Maryland. His new book, which is critical of the NSA, has sent him back to his starting point. Bamford's main thesis is that before September 11, 2001, the agency failed along with other intelligence agencies in understanding the Al-Qaida threat, even though it had intercepted members' phone calls and e-mails. This stemmed in part from excessive caution for upholding laws and respecting citizens' privacy. In April 2000, then-NSA director general Michael Hayden (currently the director of the CIA), vividly described to a Congressional committee how, if at that very moment Osama bin Laden were to step onto the Peace Bridge at Niagara Falls and cross into the United States, "my people must respect his rights." After the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the organization swung over to the other extreme. According to Bamford, since September 11 the NSA has had no compunctions about violating the Constitution and has been eavesdropping on American citizens. One of the outstanding examples in the book, which has been well-covered in the American media, is the fact that the NSA has listened in on bedroom conversations of journalists, military officers and officials serving in Iraq. The NSA may eavesdrop on and intercept transmissions outside the United States, but cannot do so to American citizens without a court order. Another of Bamford's important assertions, which also concerns Israel, is that the largest telephony and communications companies in the United States - in fact all of them except QWEST - have cooperated with the NSA, allowing it to tap their lines and optic fibers. The above-mentioned Israeli companies and others are important software and technology suppliers for not only the American telephony companies, but for the NSA itself. Bamford claims that 80 percent of all American telephone transmissions are conducted by means of the Israeli companies' technology, know-how and accessibility. Thus, Bamford believes, the American intelligence community is exposing itself to the risk that the Israeli companies will access its most secret and sensitive digital information. Bamford does not provide any backing for this thesis; he only points to a circumstantial relationship. The Israeli companies were largely established by graduates of 8200, and therefore he says they are connected by their umbilical cords to Israeli intelligence, and their CEOs and boards of directors include senior Shin Bet officials like Arik Nir or former Mossad chief Ephraim Halevy (Nir is the CEO of Athlone Global Security, a hedge fund that has invested inter alia in PerSay Voice Biometrics, and Ephraim Halevy is a member of the Athlone Advisory Board). To put it mildly, Bamford has no love lost for Israel. In his articles, he publishes claims by American Navy officials who believe Israel maliciously attacked the American spy ship Liberty during the 1967 Six-Day War. He holds that the September 11 attack did not stem from radical Islam's basic hatred of America, but rather from its anger at the United States' support for Israel. He calls the nineteen September 11 terrorists "soldiers" and describes them with a great deal of sympathy - Davids who "only" demolished four airplanes of the American Goliath. In this context, and apparently because of his deep hostility, Bamford asserts that in light of the problematic record of Israel, which did not hesitate to spy against America on American soil, Israeli companies should not have been given the keys to the kingdom of America's secrets. His attitude toward Israel apparently pushes him over the psychological brink, as his book hardly mentions the close cooperation between the two countries' intelligence communities, mainly in the war against international jihad terror or in monitoring Iran.

US Naval Update Map



















Carrier Strike Groups The USS Ronald Reagan CSG is currently located off the Goa Coast of India and is participating in the 12th annual Malabar Indo-U.S. bilateral naval exercises that began Oct. 8. Activities to be included in the exercises range from fighter combat operations to Maritime Interdiction Operations.
The USS Abraham Lincoln arrived in its home port of Everett, Wash. on Oct. 12.
The USS George Washington resumed sea training in the Pacific Ocean after recently concluding participation in the International Fleet Review in Pusan, South Korea.
The USS Dwight D. Eisenhower returned to its home port of Norfolk, Va., on October 10 after completing Tailored Ship’s Training Availability (TSTA) and Final Evaluation Problem (FEP) qualifications off the coast of Virginia.
The USS Theodore Roosevelt is currently under way in the southwestern Indian Ocean after departing from Cape Town, South Africa, on Oct. 7.
The USS John C. Stennis is currently conducting pre-deployment exercises off the coast of Southern California.
Expeditionary Strike Groups
The USS Peleliu ESG is currently en route to Hawaii after departing from a port call in Sydney, Australia, on Oct. 12.
The USS Nassau arrived in New York City on Oct. 11 to participate in the Great White Fleet celebration.
The USS Kearsarge is located off the coast of Sabana Grande de Boya, Dominican Republic, conducting humanitarian aid missions as part of Operation Continuing Promise 2008.
The USS Iwo Jima is currently under way in the Arabian Sea conducting maritime security operations in the 5th fleet area of responsibility (AOR).
The USS Essex (LHD 2) Amphibious Ready Group is currently under way in the East China Sea with the 31st MEU preparing for amphibious landing exercise PHIBLEX 08. The two-week bilateral exercises will be conducted in cooperation with military personnel of the Philippines.
The USS Bonhomme Richard arrived in San Francisco, Calif., on Oct. 12 for a three-day visit during the city’s annual Fleet Week. The crew will be hosting public ship visits and participating in various community events as part of the celebration.
The USS Boxer is currently conducting routine training operations off the coast of Southern California

Mossad's Secret Role delaying Rogue Nukes?


David Eshel
In 1950, 5-year-old Meir Huberman came to Israel as a holocaust survivor, now nearly sixty years later, renamed Dagan and toughened by almost a half-century defending the Jewish state, that son of Russian refugees heads one of the world's most fearsome secret services: the Mossad. Evidence is mounting that Dagan has restored the Mossad's reputation, after a long period of mismanagement and costly failures. According to unconfirmed sources, since Dagan was made spymaster in 2002 by his old army mentor, then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, several Arab arch- terrorists have died mysteriously in foreign operations widely attributed to Mossad.
A retired general of compact build and few words, the pipe-smoking Dagan has stayed in the shadows, but he seems to lead his agency no doubt, with an iron grip.
In Fact under his leadership, Meir Dagan's Mossad has undergone a revolution in terms of organization, intelligence and operations. Over the past two years, unofficial reports indicated, the Mossad having foiled three major Islamist attacks intended against Israeli targets in Africa, and another in Thailand.
Not everything went smooth, though. A few years ago, two Israelis were caught in Auckland trying to obtain a New Zealand passport by assuming the identity of a bedridden local man. They pleaded guilty and spent several months in jail. All-too reminiscent was Mossad's botched 1997 attempt on the life of Hamas top man Khaled Meshaal in Amman, to which Ephraim Halevy owed his promotion having forced the resignation of then-Mossad director Major General Danny Yatom.
The Israeli media is normally extremely browbeat, if not even coy, in describing activities of Mossad's secrets. Quite surprising then, was an interesting article published by the daily Haaretz newspaper on the Jewish New Year eve, which sheds some light on Meir Dagan's clandestine activities. Here are some of the highlights of this quite rare revelation.
Olmert's entry into power was Dagan's big chance. Olmert did not have the military background of his predecessor, so that Dagan's expertise could clearly come to the fore. Over the past two years Dagan has become the most important security official close to the prime minister. Olmert and his ministers are very much perturbed by developments in Iran and Meir Dagan's presentations are highly commended by all concerned.
His evaluations on the Second Lebanon War and the Mossad's cumulative achievements vis-a-vis Iran, Syria and Hezbollah have strengthened his status and led Olmert to approve more and more daring missions. But Dagan's biggest step forward came as a result of his long Lebanon experience. The Winograd Committee that investigated the 2006 war cited his evaluations, which were far more accurate than the IDF's.
During one of his last cabinet meeting, in which Olmert announced his resignation, he said: "I believe the processes the government of Israel has enacted under my leadership in various areas, those that can be told and those that cannot, will yet receive their proper place in the history of the State of Israel." While Olmert did not go into detail, analysts mention that over the past year, since September 2007 when the nuclear facility built by Syria was bombed; Hezbollah still attributes to Israel the assassination of a senior leader, Imad Mughniyeh in Damascus in February; the foreign press reported the blowing up of a chemical weapons factory in Syria, in which dozens of Iranian and Syrian technicians were killed; an Iranian Revolutionary Guards convoy delivering weapons to Hezbollah was blown up near Tehran. The Mysterious assassination of top Syrian adviser, Brigadier General Muhammad Suleiman in early August, directly connected to the nuclear issue. These events only added to the riddle, which surrounds Mossad's alleged clandestine activities. In fact, no one has claimed responsibility for these actions, but the Arabs, at least, credit Dagan's organization and whether right or wrong, it raises it's prestige.
New year's eve rumors in Tel Aviv mentioned news coming out of Damascus, that the nuclear reactor destroyed in Deir Al-Zour in the past year will be restored. Syria returned to the start of activity to build several new reactors. There were conflicting accounts in the Arab Media, about the identity of the senior officer who was killed in the bombing of the Al Qazzaz district in Damascus last week. Syrian sources said that among the dead was the Syrian army Brigadier General George Ibrahim al-Gharbi. Another report identified the slain officer as Brigadier General George Ibrahim Al-west, who was allegedly working in production management of the Syrian army. Finally, the dead man was believed to be Brigadier Abdul-Karim Abbas, Vice-Chairman of the Palestine Branch of Syrian intelligence. (Your choice- there is no official death certificate on any of these men!)
Quite surprisingly last June, prime Minister Olmert announced to the cabinet that Dagan's tenure would be extended by another, seventh year, telling the ministers "there is no doubt that the work of the Mossad has taken off" thanks to Dagan.
Dagan's main task is, however, to point his agency's activities primarily to Iran's nuclear ambitions. Gaining insider access to vital intelligence from reliable sources is a major operation, which requires top expertise and experience second to none.
In the last year of Sharon's term, the defense establishment presented a list of necessary equipment and organizational aspects to confront the Iranian threat. This included sophisticated deterrents and protection of sensitive facilities, with huge price tags. "Forget it," Dagan reportedly said. "Let me deal with Iran my way. I promise to give you deterrents in time."
Although there is only scant reliable information available to the professional media, Dagan's Mossad seems to have gained some success in attempting to delay Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's nuclear project.
Over the past year a number of reports over malfunctions have emerged regarding the Iranian nuclear project. Among them: An Iranian general who defected, Ali-Reza Asgari, had been involved in leading his country's contacts with Hezbollah; an Iranian dealer in sophisticated communications equipment was charged with spying for Israel and sentenced to death; his sons, engineers who helped build the Iranian centrifuges, were fielded as double agents for the CIA. It is still not clear who killed Ardeshire Hassanpour, 44, a leading Iranian nuclear physicist in February 2007, the local Fars news agency, reported that the man was "suffocated by fumes from a faulty gas fire in sleep." Only last February, a mysterious explosion rocked Tabriz, in which one of Iran's top secret nuclear research facilities are located. Equally mysterious are reports, which indicate serious accidents in various production plants around the country, which remain unexplained.
Some of those who warn most vociferously against the Iranian threat are full of praise for Dagan. Minister Benjamin Ben-Eliezer, who recommended Dagan's appointment to Sharon, said he restored the Mossad to being "Israel's long operational arm, with the ability to go anywhere and do anything it wanted." CIA chief Michael Hayden had warm words for the role played by an unnamed foreign intelligence agency that he said initially identified a structure at Al-Kibar as a nuclear reactor similar to one in North Korea. He likened the cooperation to "working together on a complex equation over a long period.
Dagan is now at the peak of his power. Premier-designate Tzipi Livni, a former junior officer in the Mossad, receives continual updates from him as foreign minister. But she has no experience of approving special operations. It will be interesting to see if she continues the line of approving Dagan's daring operations, or will step back and sleep on things before making her decisions.

THE COMING WAR WITH IRAN


I have served as a consultant to three very high tech aerospace firms. My specialty is conceptualizing advanced warfare especially as it relates to new cutting edge advanced weapon systems. What I see unfolding with a war on Iran is the most frightening set of circumstances I have ever seen; and I have been involved in advanced theoretical weaponry strategy and design for over 20 years.
Sometime in the weeks to months ahead, there will be a war launched against Iran. The war may be started by Israel, or by the United States, or by a NATO/EU/US embargo, or by some 'false flag' attack. What matters is that it will begin; and where it will take the world.
Regardless if the war begins with a limited number of air strikes against Iranian military and nuclear targets, or if an all-out several thousand target attack begins from day one the probabilities of the war becoming a major regional war within 48 hours are 90% or higher.
The Iranians will simply not allow Israeli and/or American military forces to attack its territory without a major response. Any significant counter-attack on Israel and/or American regional bases will trigger a much greater counter-response.
The Iranians have equipped and paid for, and trained, a massive unguided rocket and guided missile force in Lebanon (the largest such force in human history). These missiles are in-place as a MAD force (a MAD ~ mutually assured destruction ~ force is one that is a doomsday force; established to prevent the use of overwhelming military force by allowing a return "punch" of overwhelming military destructive force upon one's enemy). The total number of missiles and rockets in Lebanon are variously estimated at between 40,000 and 110,000. While many are unguided Katyusha rockets, many are longer ranged guided missiles. All are operated by Hezbollah Special Forces launch teams.
The Hezbollah Special Forces are in-effect a highly trained and well-equipped Iranian commando force of at least a Brigade in size. They man and protect a large number of mostly unguided and rather crude rockets, generally Katyusha 122mm artillery rockets with a 19 mile/30km range and capable of delivering approximately 66 pounds/30kg of warheads. Additionally, Hezbollah are known to possess a considerable number of more advanced and longer range missiles. During the 2006 war Hezbollah fired approximately 4,000 rockets (95% of which were Katyshas) all utilizing only "dumb" high explosive warheads. Some Iranian build and supplied Fajr-3 and Ra'ad 1 liquid-fueled missiles were also fired. It is believed that the larger and longer range missiles are directly under the control of Syrian and Iranian officers.
The combination of short to medium range rockets and guided missiles in Lebanon, and the longer range guided missiles in Syria, the smaller number of rockets and missiles in the West Bank and Gaza, and the longer range guided missiles in Iran present a massive throw weight of warheads aimed at Israel.
The 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah War (called the Second Lebanon War in Israel) was an attempt by Israel at eliminating the MAD counter-force in Lebanon. It was an attempt that failed. The Syrians had purchased (and supplied to Hezbollah) a large number of very nasty, relatively low cost Russian AT-14 Kornet solid fuel anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM) and the Iranian trained Hezbollah commandos dug in massive numbers of concrete bunkers and firing positions. After over 50 Merkava main battle tanks were hit, and the high tech American made warplanes and pinpoint weapons proved ineffective, the handwriting was on the wall. Either use neutron bombs or lose a large number of Israeli solders to remove the Hezbollah threat; or declare peace and walk away for the time being ~ the Israelis chose the latter.
It now appears that Israel has given up on the idea of a ground assault to remove the many rocket and missile launchers in Lebanon. A senior Israeli general has resigned with the complaint that the Army is not training sufficiently to fight in Lebanon. The alternative is the use of FAE (fuel air explosive) technology weapons and neutron bombs (a type of nuclear weapon that produces a higher short term radiological output and less blast output than normal nuclear weapons).
Any use of such WMD by the Israeli Army on the Hezbollah forces in Lebanon will likely automatically trigger the use of WMD warheads on whatever rockets/missiles remain operational (if their use has not already been authorized due to the nature and scope of Israeli and/or American attacks on Iran).
The bottom line of this is that Israel will face a truly massive number of rockets and missiles from Lebanon with radiological, chemical, biological and FAE weapons of mass destruction warheads. Additionally, a sizable number of such weapons/warheads will be fired from Gaza and the West Bank. The Syrians will be using larger more accurate guided missiles to shower WMD upon Israel as will the Iranians. To counter this, the Israelis will be using their Green Pine Radar system and a combination of Israeli and American anti-missile missiles. They will have good success in knocking down many incoming missiles but the sheer number of incoming weapons will totally overload all defensive measures.
Large parts of Israel will be contaminated with radiation with extremely long half-lives (many tens of thousands of years in some cases), with a mix of chemical, FAE, and biological nightmares thrown in for good measure. Total deaths will amount to one-third to one-half of the Israeli population with a large additional number being injured.
The Israeli response will be the nuclear annihilation of Syria, Iran, and parts of Lebanon with many tens of millions killed. Expect to see every city of any size destroyed. There will be insufficient people left in Syria, Iran, and large parts of Lebanon to even bury the dead. Radiation will spread around the world from the nuclear bombs.
Iranian sleeper teams in North America and western Europe will begin to "seed" the populations of these areas with a number (perhaps in the several dozens) of different man made killer viruses. People in movie theaters, churches, synagogues, shopping malls, subway stations, airports, etc., will be exposed without anyone knowing it at the time, to these advanced biowar viruses. About nine to ten days later the computer reporting systems in the western countries will begin to report back strange illnesses. That will trigger a host of measures to contain the advanced biowar viruses but it will simply be too late to prevent a massive outbreak of horrific illnesses. International travel and trade will effectively stop. People will be ordered to stay home from work and school with only critical job holders being allowed on the streets. Hospitals will be overcome with sick and dying people of all ages. The medical community will be among the first to die off. Where temporary hospitals are established in school gyms and other areas, the cross infection of several different genetically engineered viruses will ensure 100% morality of everyone in the temporary hospitals.
In the event that the neo-con nations have sought to expand the Georgia war by new attacks on Russian forces or by creating some naval incident in the Black Sea the probabilities of an quick expansion into a all-out Third World War involving Russian and NATO nuclear weapons will be at approximately 50%. Even without a global total war being initiated, Russia is apt to "sweep" the Black Sea of NATO ships with considerable loss of life on both sides.
The world will be in the worst economic depression in history as global trade will be halted for at least several months due to fears of the spread of the various advanced biowar viruses. If Israel releases the Arab specific designer advanced biowar viruses, that many claim she has, the Saudis are apt to fire their Chinese IRBMs (intermediate range ballistic missiles) and send their very well equipped air force against Israel with the small number of nuclear weapons that they possess (they have funded the Pakistani nuclear weapon program and have several Pakistani made nuclear devices). Of course, what is left of the Israeli forces will respond with additional nuclear attacks, this time on Saudi Arabia and other Arab nations for good measure.
In North America and western Europe the total number of civilians, after two months of advanced biowar illnesses, is apt to be at least a third of the population ~ a total death count of well over 200 million persons. Despite the best efforts of all nations, the man engineered super killer mutant viruses will spread throughout the world causing total numbers of perhaps a billion or more to die.
The after effect of all of this may well lead to even more war as the non-neo-con nations will be so incensed at the massive lost of life of their citizens that total global war may be unstoppable.

Tuesday, October 21, 2008

Hezbollah's Creative Tactical Use of Anti-Tank




As the world waits to see if the UN-brokered ceasefire in Lebanon holds, the Israeli army will begin assessing its disappointing performance against Hezbollah guerrillas. Among the many aspects to be investigated is the vulnerability of Israel's powerful armored corps to small, hand-held, wire-guided anti-tank weapons. Indeed, Hezbollah's innovative use of anti-tank missiles was the cause of most Israeli casualties and has given the small but powerful weapons a new importance in battlefield tactics.
In a recent statement, Hezbollah's armed wing, al- Moqawama al-Islamia (Islamic Resistance), described Israel's main battle-tank as "a toy for the rockets of the resistance" (al-Manar TV, August 11). Hezbollah's antitank weapons consist of a variety of wire-guided missiles (usually of Russian design and manufactured and/or supplied by Iran and Syria) and rocket-propelled grenade
launchers (RPGs). The missiles include the Europeanmade Milan, the Russian-designed Metis-M, Sagger AT- 3, Spigot AT-4 and the Russian-made Kornet AT-14. The latter is a Syrian supplied missile capable of targeting low-flying helicopters. Iraqi Fedayeen irregulars used the Kornet against U.S. forces in 2003. The most portable versions of these weapons are carried in a fiberglass
case with a launching rail attached to the lid.
On July 30, the Israeli army published photos of various anti-tank missiles they claim to have found in a Hezbollah bunker (see: ttp://www.hnn.co.il/index.php?modul... sk=view;id=967). The weapons include Saggers and TOW missiles. The TOW (Tube-launched, Opticallytracked, Wire-guided) missile is a formidable weapon first produced by the United States in the 1970s. These missiles were of interest as their packing crates were marked 2001, suggesting that these were relatively new additions to Hezbollah's arsenal and not part of the shipment of TOW missiles from Israel to Iran that was part of the Iran-Contra scandal of 1986 (the shelf-life of the TOW is roughly 20 years). On August 6, Israeli Major-
General Benny Gantz showed film of BGM-71 TOW and Sagger AT-3 missiles he reported were captured at one of Hezbollah's field headquarters (Haaretz, August 6). The primary target of Hezbollah's battlefield missiles is the Israeli-made Merkava tank. The Merkava was designed for the maximum protection of its crews, with heavy armor and a rear escape hatch. The emphasis on crew survival is not simply a humanitarian gesture; the small country of Israel cannot provide an endless number of trained, combat-ready tank crews if casualties begin to mount. The tank is also designed to be easily and quickly repaired, a specialty of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). The modular armor plating can be easily replaced if damaged, or replaced entirely with upgraded materials
when available. The first generation of Merkavas was built in the 1970s and was soon deployed in Lebanon in 1982. The much-improved Merkava Mk 4 has been Israel's main battle-tank since its introduction in 2004. Current battlefield reports suggest that Hezbollah fighters are well-trained in aiming at the Merkava's most vulnerable points, resulting in as many as one-quarter
of their missiles successfully piercing the armor (Yediot Aharonot, August 10). Hezbollah attacks on Merkava tanks during the November 2005 raid on the border town of Ghajar were videotaped and closely examined to find points where the armor was susceptible to missile attack. While some of their missiles have impressive ranges (up to three kilometers), the guerrillas prefer to fire from close range to maximize their chances of hitting weak points on the Merkava. Operating in two- or three-man teams, the insurgents typically try to gain the high ground in the hilly terrain before selecting targets, using wellconcealed missile stockpiles that allow them to operate behind Israeli lines (Jerusalem Post, August 3). Without artillery, Hezbollah has adapted its use of antitank missiles for mobile fire support against Israeli troops taking cover in buildings. There are numerous reports of such use, the most devastating being on August 9, when an anti-tank missile collapsed an entire building, claiming
the lives of nine Israeli reservists (Y-net, August 10). Four soldiers from Israel's Egoz (an elite reconnaissance unit) were killed in a Bint Jbail house when it was struck by a Sagger missile (Haaretz, August 6). TOW missiles were used effectively in 2000 against IDF outposts in south Lebanon before the Israeli withdrawal. There are also recent instances of anti-tank weapons being used against Israeli infantry in the field, a costly means of warfare but one that meets two important Hezbollah criteria: the creation of Israeli casualties and the preservation of highly-outnumbered Hezbollah guerrillas who can fire the
weapons from a relatively safe distance. It was suggested that the IDF helicopter brought down by Hezbollah fire on August 12 was hit by an anti-tank missile. Hezbollah claimed to have used a new missile called the Wa'ad (Promise), although the organization occasionally renames existing missiles (Jerusalem Post, August 12). At least one of Israel's ubiquitous armored bulldozers has also fallen prey to Hezbollah's missiles. The Syrian-made RPG-29 was previously used with some success against Israeli tanks in Gaza. Hezbollah also uses this weapon, with a dual-warhead that allows it to penetrate armor. On August 6, the Israeli press reported that IDF intelligence sources claimed that an improved Russian-made version of the RPG-29 was being sold to Syria before transfer to the Islamic Resistance (Haaretz, August 6). In response, Russia's Foreign Ministry denied any involvement in supplying anti-tank weapons to
Hezbollah (RIA Novosti, August 10). The IDF reports that anti-tank missiles and rockets continue to cross the border into Lebanon from Syria, despite the destruction of roads and bridges in the area (Haaretz, August 13).
The Merkava tank has assumed an important role as a symbol of Israeli military might. Their destruction in combat has an important symbolic value for Hezbollah. Hezbollah's tactical innovations and reliance on antitank
missiles over more traditional infantry weapons will undoubtedly prompt serious introspection on the part of the IDF in anticipation of renewed conflict along the border.
Dr. Andrew McGregor is the director of Aberfoyle
International Security Analysis in Toronto, Canada.

Hezbollah’s Terrorist Threat to the European Union


Talking Points
• Hezbollah poses a greater potential terrorist threat to the United States and to the European
Union than al-Qaeda does, by virtue of the unstinting support it receives from
Iran and Syria.
• The EU has adopted an ostrich-like policy that mistakenly accepts the fiction that Hezbollah’s “political wing” can be distinguished from its terrorist wing.
• The EU must designate Hezbollah as a terrorist group and ban its activities to protect European citizens from terrorist attacks and prohibit Hezbollah fundraising operations in Europe.
• Funds raised in Europe enable Hezbollah to threaten the stability of Lebanon, undermine
the security of Israel, obstruct Arab–Israeli peace efforts, and help Iran to destabilize the
volatile Middle East. Hezbollah’s Terrorist Threat to the European Union
James Phillips Hezbollah (“Party of God”), the radical Lebanonbased
Shiite revolutionary movement, poses a clear terrorist threat to international security. Hezbollah terrorists have murdered Americans, Israelis, Lebanese, Europeans, and the citizens of many other nations. Originally founded in 1982, this group has evolved from a local menace into a global terrorist network strongly backed by radical regimes in Iran and Syria,
and funded by a web of charitable organizations, criminal activities, and front companies.
Hezbollah regards terrorism not only as a useful tool for advancing its revolutionary agenda but as a religious duty as part of a “global jihad.” It helped to introduce and popularize the horrific tactic of suicide bombings in Lebanon in the 1980s, developed a strong guerrilla force and a political apparatus in the 1990s, and became a major destabilizing influence in the Arab–Israeli conflict in the last decade.
Prior to September 11, 2001, Hezbollah murdered more Americans than any other terrorist group.
Despite al-Qaeda’s increased visibility since then, Hezbollah remains a bigger, better equipped, better organized, and potentially more dangerous terrorist organization, in part because it enjoys the unstinting support of the two chief state sponsors of terrorism in the world today—Iran and Syria. Hezbollah’s threat potential led former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage to dub it “the A-Team of terrorism.”
Hezbollah is a cancer that has metastasized, expanding its operations from Lebanon, first to strike regional targets in the Middle East, then far beyond. It now is truly a global terrorist threat that draws financial and logistical support from the Lebanese Shiite diaspora in the Middle East, Europe, Africa, Southeast Asia, North America, and South America.
Hezbollah fundraising and equipment procurement cells have been detected and broken up in the United States and Canada. Europe is believed to contain many more of these cells.
Hezbollah has been implicated in numerous terrorist attacks against Americans, including:
• The April 18, 1983, bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut Lebanon, which killed 63
people, including 17 Americans;
• The October 23, 1983, suicide truck bombing of the Marine barracks at Beirut Airport, which
killed 241 Marines deployed as part of the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon;
• The September 20, 1984, bombing of the U.S. Embassy annex in Lebanon; and
• The 1996 Khobar Towers bombing, which killed 19 American servicemen stationed in
Saudi Arabia.
Hezbollah also was involved in the kidnapping of several dozen Westerners, including 14 Americans, who were held as hostages in Lebanon in the 1980s.
The American hostages eventually became pawns that Iran used as leverage in the secret negotiations that led to the Iran-Contra affair in the mid-1980s.
Hezbollah has launched numerous attacks at farflung targets outside the Middle East. Hezbollah perpetrated the two deadliest terrorist attacks in the history of South America—the March 1992 bombing of the Israeli Embassy in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which killed 29 people; and the July 1994 bombing of a Jewish community center in Buenos Aires that killed 96 people. The trial of those implicated in the 1994 bombing revealed an extensive Hezbollah presence in Argentina and other countries in South America. Hezbollah also was involved in aborted attempts to bomb the Israeli Embassy in Bangkok, Thailand, in 1994, and in a failed plot in Singapore.
Hezbollah’s Terrorist Threat in Europe Hezbollah poses a direct threat to EU citizens at
home and those traveling abroad, especially in the Middle East. Hezbollah established a presence
inside European countries in the 1980s amid the influx of Lebanese citizens seeking to escape Lebanon’s brutal civil war and the recurring clashes between Israel and Palestinian terrorists based in Lebanese refugee camps. Hezbollah took root among Lebanese Shiite immigrant communities throughout Europe. German intelligence officials estimate that roughly 900 Hezbollah members live in Germany alone. Hezbollah also has developed an extensive web of fundraising and logistical support cells spread throughout Europe.
France and Britain have been the principal European targets of Hezbollah terrorism, in part because both countries opposed Hezbollah’s agenda in Lebanon and were perceived to be enemies of Iran, Hezbollah’s chief patron. Hezbollah has been involved in many terrorist attacks against Europeans, including:
• The October 1983 bombing of the French contingent of the multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon (on the same day as the U.S. Marine barracks bombing), which killed 58
French soldiers;
• The December 1983 bombing of the French Embassy in Kuwait;
• The April 1985 bombing of a restaurant near a U.S. base in Madrid, Spain, which killed 18
Spanish citizens;
• A campaign of 13 bombings in France in 1986 that targeted shopping centers and railroad
facilities, killing 13 people and wounding more than 250; and
• A March 1989 attempt to assassinate British novelist Salman Rushdie, which failed when a
bomb exploded prematurely, killing a terrorist in London. Hezbollah attacks in Europe trailed off in the 1990s after Hezbollah’s Iranian sponsors accepted a truce in their bloody 1980–1988 war with Iraq and no longer needed a surrogate to punish states that Tehran perceived to be supporting Iraq. But this lull could quickly come to an end if the situation changes in Lebanon or Iran is embroiled in another conflict.
Significantly, the participation of European troops in Lebanese peacekeeping operations, which
became a lightning rod for Hezbollah terrorist attacks in the 1980s, could become an issue again
today, as Hezbollah attempts to revive its aggressive operations in southern Lebanon. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden have contributed troops to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon. Troops from EU member states may find themselves attacked by Hezbollah with weapons financed by Hezbollah’s supporters in
their home countries.
According to intelligence officials, Hezbollah operatives are deployed throughout Europe, including Belgium, Bosnia, Britain, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Norway, Romania, Russia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, and Ukraine.
Radicalizing European Muslims Europe’s vacation from Hezbollah terrorist attacks could come to a swift end if Hezbollah succeeds in its attempts to convert European Muslims to its harsh ideology. Young Muslim militants in Berlin, asked in a television interview to explain their hatred of the United States and Jews, cited Hezbollah’s al-Manar TV as one of their main sources of
information. Ideas have consequences. In July 2006, four months after Hezbollah leader Hassan
Nasrallah, in an interview broadcast on al-Manar TV, called for Muslims to take a decisive stand
against the Danish cartoons featuring the prophet Mohammed, two Lebanese students sought to
bomb two trains in Germany as a reprisal for the cartoons, but the bombs failed to detonate.
Clearly, Europeans are exposing themselves to increased risks of terrorism as long as they allow
Hezbollah’s political and propaganda apparatus to spew a witch’s brew of hatred, incitement, and calls for vengeance.
Hezbollah’s Role as a Proxy for Iran Hezbollah is a close ally, frequent surrogate, and terroristsubcontractor for Iran’s revolutionary Islamic regime. Iran played a crucial role in creating Hezbollah in 1982 as a vehicle for exporting its revolution, mobilizing Lebanese Shiites, and developing a terrorist surrogate for attacks on Iran’s enemies. Tehran provides the bulk of Hezbollah’s foreign support: arms, training, logistical support, and money. Iran provides
at least $100 million (and probably closer to $200 million) of annual support for Hezbollah and has lavishly stocked Hezbollah’s expensive and extensive arsenal of Katyusha rockets, sophisticated mines, small arms, ammunition, explosives, anti-ship missiles,
anti-aircraft missiles, and even unmanned aerial vehicles that Hezbollah can use for aerial surveillance or remotely piloted terrorist attacks. Iranian Revolutionary Guards have trained Hezbollah terrorists in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley and in Iran.
Iran has used Hezbollah as a club to hit not only Israel and its Western enemies, but also many Arab countries. Iran’s revolutionary ideology has fed its hostility to other Muslim governments, which it seeks to overthrow and replace with radical allies. During the Iran–Iraq war, Tehran used Hezbollah to launch terrorist attacks against Iraqi targets and against Arab states that sided with Iraq. Hezbollah launched numerous terrorist attacks against Saudi
Arabia and Kuwait, which extended strong financial support to Iraq’s war effort, and participated in several other terrorist operations in Bahrain and the United Arab Emirates. Iranian officials conspired with the Saudi branch of Hezbollah to conduct the
1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia.
Today, Hezbollah continues to cooperate with the Iranian Revolutionary Guards to destabilize Iraq, where both groups help train and equip the Mahdi Army, the radical anti-Western Shiite militia led by the militant cleric Moqtada al-Sadr.
By refusing to use its economic leverage over Iran to dissuade Tehran from continuing its troubling nuclear weapons program, the EU is making a military
clash between the United States and Iran much more likely. In that event, Hezbollah cells throughout Europe are likely to be activated to strike at American, and perhaps NATO, targets. Even if Hezbollah elects to restrict its focus to American embassies, businesses, and tourists, many Europeans are likely to perish in such attacks.
Hezbollah’s Ties with Other Terrorist Groups In addition to the direct threat Hezbollah poses
to Europeans, it also poses an indirect threat by virtue of its collaboration with other terrorist groups that have targeted Europeans. Many of these groups
already have been placed on the EU terrorism list.
Hezbollah has developed a cooperative relationship on an ad hoc basis with the al-Qaeda terrorist network and several radical Palestinian groups. In
June 2002, U.S. and European intelligence officials noted that Hezbollah was “increasingly teaming up with al-Qaeda on logistics and training for terrorist operations.” Both al-Qaeda and Hezbollah established training bases in Sudan after the 1989 coup that brought the radical National Islamic Front to power.
Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, which also established a strong presence in Sudan to support the Sudanese regime, ran several training camps for Arab radical Islamic groups there and may have facilitated cooperative efforts between the two terrorist groups.
Another worrisome web of cooperation between Hezbollah, al-Qaeda, and Hamas support networks is flourishing in the tri-border region at the juncture of Argentina, Brazil, and Paraguay. This lawless and corrupt region has provided lucrative opportunities for Hezbollah supporters to raise funds, launder money, obtain fraudulent documents, pass counterfeit
currency, and smuggle drugs, arms, and people.
Modern terrorist networks often are composed of loosely organized transnational webs of autonomous cells, which help them to defeat the efforts of various law enforcement, intelligence, and internal security agencies to dismantle them. This decentralized structure also helps to conceal the hand of state sponsors that seek to use terrorist groups for their own ends while minimizing the risk of retaliation from states targeted by the terrorists.
The amorphous, non-hierarchical nature of the networks, and their linkages with cooperative criminal networks, leads to a situation in which some nodes of the web function as part of more than one terrorist group. This cross-pollination of terrorist networks makes it difficult to determine where one terrorist group ends and another one begins. Therefore, giving Hezbollah a free pass to operate inside the European Union also aids other groups who are
plugged into the same web of criminal gangs, family enterprises, or clan networks.
In 2002, Germany closed down a charitablefundraising organization, the al-Aqsa Fund, whichreportedly was a Hamas front that also raised moneyfor Hezbollah. Hezbollah also has colluded with al-Qaeda affiliates in Asia. Abdul Nasser Nooh assistedboth Hezbollah and al-Qaeda activities, andMuhammad Amed al-Khalifa, a Hezbollah member,was involved in sending a shipment of explosives tothe Philippines through an al-Qaeda front company.According to U.S. intelligence officials, Hezbollahhas cooperated with the terrorist network formerlyled by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was killedin Iraq in 2006. This network officially became partof al-Qaeda in 2004. Despite Zarqawi’s militantlyanti-Shia views, the two groups have reportedlycoordinated terrorist efforts against Israel on an adhoc basis. Zarqawi’s network, composed of Sunniextremists from Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, the Palestinianterritories, Iraq and other countries, has astrong fundraising and support infrastructure inEurope that poses a significant threat to Europeansas well as citizens of a wide range of other countries.In the Middle East, Hezbollah has cooperatedwith Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and Fatah’sAl-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades to launch terroristattacks against Israelis. After the outbreak of thesecond Palestinian intifada in 2000, Hezbollah’snotorious terrorism coordinator, Imad Mugniyah,was selected by Iran to assist Palestinian terroristoperations against Israel. Mugniyah reportedlyplayed a role in facilitating the shipment of 50tons of Iranian arms and military supplies to Palestinianmilitants on board the freighter Karine A,which was intercepted by Israeli naval forces inthe Red Sea in January 2002 before its cargo couldbe delivered. Hezbollah has also provided Hamasand other Palestinian extremist groups with technicalexpertise for suicide bombing.Hezbollah’s DestabilizingInfluence in the Middle EastHezbollah threatens the security and stability ofthe Middle East, and European interests in the MiddleEast, on a number of fronts. In addition to itsmurderous campaign against Israel, Hezbollahseeks to violently impose its totalitarian agenda andsubvert democracy in Lebanon. Although someexperts believed that Hezbollah’s participation inthe 1992 Lebanese elections and subsequent inclupage5No. 1038 Delivered June 20, 2007sion in Lebanon’s parliament and coalition governmentswould moderate its behavior, its politicalinclusion brought only cosmetic changes.After Israel’s May 2000 withdrawal from southernLebanon and the September 2000 outbreak offighting between Israelis and Palestinians, Hezbollahstepped up its support for Palestinian extremistgroups such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad,the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades, and the PopularFront for the Liberation of Palestine. It also expandedits own operations in the West Bank and Gazaand provided funding for specific attacks launchedby other groups.In July 2006, Hezbollah forces crossed the internationallyrecognized border to kidnap Israeli soldiersinside Israel, igniting a military clash thatclaimed hundreds of lives and severely damaged theeconomies on both sides of the border. Hezbollah isrebuilding its depleted arsenal with financial supportfrom its European fundraising networks. Thisposes a threat to European soldiers in the U.N.peacekeeping force in Lebanon. To be consistent,the EU should ban such fundraising.Hezbollah uses Europe as a staging area andrecruiting ground for infiltrating terrorists into Israel.Hezbollah has dispatched operatives to Israelfrom Europe to gather intelligence and execute terroristattacks. Examples of Hezbollah operativeswho have traveled to Israel from Europe includeHussein Makdad, a Lebanese national who used aforged British passport to enter Israel from Switzerlandin 1996 and injured himself in a prematurebomb explosion in his Jerusalem hotel room; StefanSmirnak, a German convert to Islam who wastrained by Hezbollah in Lebanon, and was arrestedat Ben Gurion airport after flying to Israel in 1997;Fawzi Ayoub, a Canadian citizen of Lebanesedescent, who was arrested in 2000 after traveling toIsrael on a boat from Europe; and Gerard Shuman,a dual Lebanese–British citizen, who was arrested inIsrael in 2001.Additionally, long before al-Qaeda and the Talibanbegan to finance their operations using profitsfrom drug smuggling from Afghanistan, Hezbollahwas a major supplier of illicit drugs to Europe andother regions. The organization tapped into longstandingsmuggling networks operated by Shiiteclans in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley, a Hezbollah stronghold.Hezbollah raises money from smuggling Lebaneseopium, hashish, and heroin. It also traffics inillicit drugs in the tri-border region of South America.Hezbollah cells also engage in other forms ofcriminal activity, such as credit card fraud and traffickingin “conflict diamonds” in Sierra Leone, Congo,and Liberia to finance their activities.The EU’s Ostrich-Like PolicyRegarding HezbollahThe United States long has designated Hezbollahas a Foreign Terrorist Organization. Australia, Canada,and the Netherlands have followed suit. TheUnited Kingdom has placed the “Hezbollah ExternalSecurity Organization” on its terrorist list. Butthe European Union has dragged its feet on takingserious action against Hezbollah.In May 2002, the EU added 11 organizations andseven individuals to its financial sanctions list for terrorism.This was the first time that the EU froze theassets of non-European terrorist groups. But it didnot sanction Hezbollah as an organization—onlyseveral individual leaders, such as Imad Mugniyah.By taking these half-measures, the EU mistakenlyhas embraced the fallacy that terrorist operationscan be separated from the other activities of a radicalorganization. Attempts to compartmentalize theperceived threat by accepting the fiction that a“political wing” is qualitatively different from a “militarywing” are self-defeating. This is a distinctionwithout a difference.Hezbollah’s raison d’être is to violently impose itstotalitarian ideology on Muslims and forge a radicalIslamic state determined to destroy Israel and driveout Western and other non-Islamic influences fromthe Muslim world. No genuine “political party”would finance suicide bombings and accumulate anarsenal of over 10,000 rockets to be indiscriminatelylaunched at civilians in a neighboring country.Agreeing to accept a false distinction betweenpolitical and terrorist wings is also dangerous. Itallows Hezbollah to continue raising money for violentpurposes. Money is fungible. Funds raised inEurope, ostensibly to finance charitable and politicalcauses, can free up money to finance terroristattacks or can be diverted to criminal activities. Thepage 6No. 1038 Delivered June 20, 2007recent violent convulsion in Gaza and last summer’swar in Lebanon underscore the great dangers inherentin treating radical Islamic movements as normalpolitical parties.Hezbollah leaders themselves see little distinctionbetween political and terrorist activity (which theyconsider to be “military” or “resistance” actions).Mohammed Raad, one of Hezbollah’s representativesin the Lebanese parliament, proclaimed in 2001,“Hezbollah is a military resistance party, and it is ourtask to fight the occupation of our land…There is noseparation between politics and resistance.” In 2002,Mohammed Fannish, a Hezbollah political leaderand former Lebanese Minister of Energy, declared: “Ican state that there is no separating between Hezbollahmilitary and political aims.”The EU also excluded the fundraising network ofHamas from the terrorism list in 2002. But inAugust 2003, the EU reversed itself and classified allof Hamas as a terrorist organization. It is high timeto do the same with Hezbollah.Some Europeans may hope that by passivelyaccepting Hezbollah’s fundraising activities, the EUcan escape its terrorism. But this ostrich-like policyignores the fact that fundraising cells easily cantransform themselves into operational terrorist cellsif called on to do so. Hezbollah cells are like stemcells that can morph into other forms and take onnew duties. The Federal Bureau of Investigation haswarned that Hezbollah support cells inside theUnited States could also undertake terrorist attacks.The same is true in Europe.Individual EU member states, such as Franceand Germany, have previously taken legal actionagainst Hezbollah. Germany has deported Hezbollahoperatives and France banned Hezbollah’s al-Manar television network in 2004. But such actionswere undertaken in an ad hoc manner on a countryby-country basis, not in a systematic manner by theEU as a whole. Given that protecting citizens is thehighest duty of the state, such half-hearted piecemealpolicies are irresponsible.Putting Hezbollah on the EU terrorism list wouldrequire the consent of all 27 EU member states.Such action would oblige each member to prohibitthe channeling of money from European entitiesand individuals to Hezbollah, and to seize Hezbollahassets in the EU. On March 10, 2005, the EUParliament voted overwhelmingly to adopt a resolutionthat affirmed Hezbollah’s involvement in terroristactivities and ordered the EU Council to “take allnecessary steps to curtail” Hezbollah.But France, Spain, and Belgium have blockedaction in recent years. French Foreign MinisterMichel Barnier in February 2005 justified Frenchopposition to declaring Hezbollah to be a terroristgroup by saying: “Hezbollah has a parliamentaryand political dimension in Lebanon. They havemembers of parliament who are participating inparliamentary life. As you know, political life inLebanon is difficult and fragile.” But one major reasonthat life is so “difficult and fragile” in Lebanonis that Hezbollah, backed by Iran and Syria, seeksto intimidate democratic forces in Lebanonthrough the use of terrorism. Taking a stand againstHezbollah not only would undermine its ability tofinance terrorism against its Lebanese opponents,but would also make life much less difficult in Lebanonin the long run.Classifying Hezbollah as a terrorist organizationwould significantly constrain its ability to operate inEurope and severely erode its ability to raise fundsthere and use European banks to transfer fundsaround the globe. All EU member states would berequired to freeze Hezbollah assets and prohibitHezbollah-related financial transactions. Hezbollahleader Hassan Nasrallah recognized the damage thatthis would do to his organization in a March 2005interview aired on Hezbollah’s al-Manar televisionnetwork: “The sources of [our] funding will dry upand the sources of moral, political, and materialsupport will be destroyed.”But France in particular has blocked action on takingthe logical next step with Hezbollah. The recentelection of Nicolas Sarkozy as France’s new presidentoffers hope for a major shift in the French position.Sarkozy hopefully will replace Jacques Chirac’s “SeeNo Evil” wishful thinking with a principled standagainst permitting a lethal killing machine to infectalienated European Muslims with its violent ideology,milk them of money to finance mass murder, andbrainwash them to become suicide bombers against awide array of targets.page 7No. 1038 Delivered June 20, 2007What EU Leaders Should DoEuropean Union leaders must be persuadedto take concerted and systematic action againstHezbollah. First and foremost, they must understandthat in the long run, this is the best way toprotect their own people, the highest duty of government.Wishful thinking about the possibility ofinducing Hezbollah to stray from the fundamentaltenets of its own ideology will compromise thesecurity of EU citizens. Turning a blind eye toHezbollah’s activities will only allow it to metastasizeinto a more deadly threat. Cracking down onHezbollah activities would not only reduce thepotential terrorist threat, but would reduce thethreat of its ancillary activities, such as drug smuggling,criminal enterprises, and efforts to radicalizeEuropean Muslim communities.Second, EU leaders can be criticized for thestrained logic behind their current position. Itmakes little sense to designate individual Hezbollahleaders as terrorists, but continue to permit theorganization to raise money for their deadly work. Itis a mistake to exempt Hezbollah’s “political wing”from responsibility for the crimes perpetrated bythe “military wing” that executes its orders. Runninga hospital or an orphanage does not absolve anorganization for the murder of innocents. The EUmust be proactive and uproot Hezbollah’s supportinfrastructure in Europe in order to curtail the activitiesof its terrorist thugs around the world.Third, EU leaders should be asked to join themultilateral efforts of their democratic allies to protectall of their citizens from the attacks of totalitarianIslamic extremists. There is an ideological dimensionto this conflict, as well as a terrorist dimension. Itwould be irresponsible for the EU to stay neutral inthis global ideological struggle, given the presence ofa growing Muslim population inside Europe thatcould fall prey to radical Islamic ideologies.Banning Hezbollah also would be a step thatwould help stabilize the volatile Middle East andsupport Arab–Israeli peace efforts. Even the PalestinianAuthority requested that the EU ban Hezbollahin 2005, complaining that Hezbollah wasrecruiting Palestinian suicide bombers to sabotagethe tenuous truce with Israel.Putting Hezbollah on the EU terrorism list alsowould help stabilize Lebanon. U.N. Security CouncilResolution 1559, jointly sponsored by France and theUnited States, calls for the disarming of all militias inLebanon. Yet EU toleration of Hezbollah fundraisingoperations inside its own borders enables efforts tofinance the purchase of arms and ammunition for thebiggest and most dangerous militia in Lebanon. AddingHezbollah to the EU terrorism list would be animportant step toward disarming its militia andrestoring the rule of law in Lebanon.Banning Hezbollah also would contribute to thecontainment of Iran’s rising power. Tehran has used itsLebanese surrogate to advance its own radical foreignpolicy agenda in the past and is sure to do so again.The U.S. Congress has played a role in appealingfor greater cooperation from the EU in curtailingHezbollah’s activities. The House of Representatives,in March 2005, passed H. Res. 101, whichurged the EU to add Hezbollah to its terrorist list.The Senate followed suit the next month. Congressshould continue to press the EU to do the rightthing regarding Hezbollah by passing further resolutionsand holding hearings such as this one toeducate EU leaders and their constituencies aboutthe potential challenges posed by Hezbollah.The EU can no longer afford to ignore Hezbollah’sfestering threat or hope to deflect its attacks ontoother countries. The longer the EU balks at effectiveaction, the stronger the potential threat grows, fundedby the free flow of donations, diverted charitablefunds, and criminal booty out of the EU and the paymentsfor drugs smuggled into the EU.As Winston Churchill observed, “An appeaser isone who feeds a crocodile, hoping it will eat himlast.” The Hezbollah crocodile has eaten half of Lebanonand has laid dangerous eggs around the world.The EU must take proactive action, not wait forthese eggs to hatch.—James Phillips is Research Fellow for Middle EasternAffairs in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center forForeign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn andShelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies,at The Heritage Foundation. These remarks were deliveredJune 20, 2007, as testimony before the U.S. HouseCommittee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe.